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Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of
Manifest Disregard
By Jill Gross'
The scope of permissible judicial review of arbitration awards poses
the fundamental policy question of whether and to what degree courts
should intervene in the finality of the arbitration process to ensure its
integrity. Any regulation of arbitration must balance enforcement of
the parties' selection of that dispute resolution process with courts'
reluctance to stamp their imprimatur on awards resulting from a
fundamentally unfair process or reflecting a fundamentally unfair
outcome. Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")' provides "streamlined"2 mechanisms to enable arbitration parties to obtain prompt
confirmation," vacatur" or modificationS of an arbitration award on
specified grounds without the need to file collateral actions that
otherwise would be required to enforce an award in court.
Since the enactment of the FAA, some courts have crafted extrastatutory grounds for award enforcement, due to their discomfort with
award finality and arbitrators' lack of accountability." For example,
courts have vacated "arbitrary and capricious"7 awards, those
rendered in "manifest disregard of the law,'" and those that contravened public policy." Some parties to arbitration agreements, perhaps
troubled by the unbridled power of arbitrators to bind them to awards
that do not necessarily follow the law, manage risk by incorporating
expanded grounds for judicial review of the award, particularly for
legal error, into their arbitration agreements.'o
The Supreme Court halted this expansion in Hall Street Assocs. v.
Mattel, Inc. " The Court resolved a widening split in the circuit Courts
of Appeal 12 and ruled that the grounds for vacating an arbitration
award listed in section lO(a) of the FAA13 are exclusive. Thus, parties
cannot contractually expand the grounds for judicial review of an
arbitration award when invoking FAA's vacatur provisions. 14 In
balancing the competing policy concerns of arbitration law, the Hall
Street Court elevated the finality of arbitration over the parties'
freedom of contract.
The Hall Street decision necessarily impacted subsequent jurisprudence regarding parties' motions to vacate arbitration awards. While
'Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, and Director, Pace Investor
Rights Clinic.
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the opinion clearly and explicitly barred further contractual expansion of grounds for review, it also avoided and thus left unresolved the
issue of whether it would endorse or reject the judicially-crafted
"manifest disregard of the law" ground for review of an arbitration
award.'s In the short time since Hall Street, a new circuit split has
emerged on the question of whether manifest disregard of the law
survives Hall Street as a valid ground to vacate an award under the
FAA.'· This article will explore that question.
I. Background
The FAA, enacted by Congress in 1925, declares ''valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable" any "written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, . . .
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."'7 The statute reflects a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration.'· The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
Congress promulgated the FAA "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."'9
Among other powers, the FAA conveys to federal courts the authority to enforce, modify, confirm or vacate arbitration agreements or
awards arising from maritime transactions or transactions involving
commerce!O Pursuant to section 9 of the FAA, a court "must" confirm
an arbitration award "unless" it is vacated, modified, or corrected "as
prescribed" in sections 10 and 11}'
FAA section 10 establishes the criteria upon which a court may
vacate an arbitration award:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1) where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made!2
233
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Section 11 of the FAA provides additional grounds for modifying or
correcting an award.'3
The Supreme Court often refers to FAA arbitration as "a matter of
consent, not coercion," and has declared that "parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.""
Because the FAA does not prevent "the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself,"
parties to arbitration agreements can "specify by contract the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted."'5
Prior to Hall Street, federal appellate courts disagreed as to whether
section 10 provided the exclusive basis for vacatur relief in cases arising under the FAA.'· The First,27 Third;" Fourth;" Fifth30 and Sixth
Circuits" held that parties may contract for expanded judicial review
beyond the scope of section 10. These courts premised their respective
holdings on the notion that the FAA, first and foremost, is a statute
designed to enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate according to their
specific terms." If the parties specified in their arbitration agreements
additional grounds for review, then the court should apply those
grounds.
By contrast, the Seventh," Ninth 34 and Tenth 35 Circuits held that
parties may not expand judicial review contractually. These courts
reasoned that, while allowing parties to choose by contract the rules
and procedures they wanted to govern their arbitration process, the
Supreme Court has never allowed parties to determine by contract
what rules and procedures a federal court should follow. 3• These courts
rejected the creation of federal powers by contract. 37
In 2007, Hall Street provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve this circuit split.
II. The Hall Street Opinion
Hall Street arose from a landlord-tenant dispute. MatteI rented
property from Hall Street Associates to use for manufacturing. A provision in the lease required MatteI to indemnify Hall Street for any
costs related to the failure of MatteI (or its predecessor lessees) to
comply with environmental laws while using the premises. Groundwater analysis of the leased premises in 1998 revealed the presence of
high levels of trichloroethylene ("TCE");' a toxic chemical by-product
of various manufacturing processes employed by MatteI and its
predecessors between 1951 and 1980.""
Subsequent to the TCE discovery, MatteI notified Hall Street of its
intent to terminate the lease. Hall Street sued, alleging that MatteI:
(i) did not have the right to vacate the premises on the specified date;
and (ii) was obligated to indemnify Hall Street for costs connected to
the TCE well contamination and its related non-compliance with the
234
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Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (the "Oregon Act")"o Following a
bench trial, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
ruled that MatteI could terminate the lease lawfully.41 Thereafter, the
parties attempted, unsuccessfully, to mediate a settlement of Matters
disputed duty to indemnify Hall Street:'
The parties then agreed to arbitrate the indemnification issue. In
the relevant post-dispute arbitration agreement, the parties provided
for judicial review of the award for legal error - a basis not found in
FAA section 10,,3 The arbitrator resolved the dispute in favor of MatteI, reasoning that, since the lease required adherence only to "applicable" federal, state and local environmental laws, MatteI did not
owe indemnification costs to Hall Street because the Oregon Act applied only to human health, not environmental contamination."
The district court granted Hall Street's motion to vacate the
arbitrator's award on the basis that the arbitrator committed legal error in concluding that the Oregon Act did not apply to environmental
contamination. 45 Through application of the agreement's provision for
expanded judicial review, the district court relied on then-existing
Ninth Circuit precedent for the principle that parties to an arbitration
agreement could agree to expand the standards of review of an arbitration award contractually"·
On remand, the arbitrator held the Oregon Act applied and MatteI
moved to vacate the second award. The district court corrected the
arbitrator's interest calculation but otherwise confirmed the award. 47
MatteI then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
arguing that the Ninth Circuit's recent en banc opinion overturned
LaPine"· therefore invalidating the expanded standard of review set
forth in the parties' arbitration agreement. The Ninth Circuit agreed
with MatteI and reversed the district court's judgment, and the
Supreme Court granted Hall Street's petition for writ of certiorari to
resolve the circuit split'"
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Souter, the Supreme
Court held the FAA's grounds for prompt vacatur and modification of
awards are exclusive for parties seeking expedited review pursuant to
the statute. 50 Furthermore, the Court held parties cannot expand or
modify these grounds by contract."' Thus, the Hall Street Court
enforced the portion of the arbitration agreement vesting jurisdiction
with the arbitrators but not the language providing for expanded
review. 5 ' In effect, this decision precludes all parties who seek "expeditious judicial review" pursuant to FAA §§ 9 to 11 from incorporating
expanded standards of review into arbitration agreements."3
III. Manifest Disregard of the Law
While not part of its primary holding, Hall Street dicta casts doubt
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directly on the continued vitality of the "manifest disregard of the
law" ground for review. The "manifest disregard" standard originated
from a statement by the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan;" a 1953
case in which the Court first explored the arbitrability of claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"). The Wilko
Court justified holding Securities Act claims were not arbitrable by
specifically noting aspects of the arbitration process that could dimin-.
ish the Securities Act's protections, including the fact that "interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation. "55
By 2008, every federal circuit had converted Wilko's dicta into a
basis to vacate an arbitration award. While the precise test varied
from circuit to circuit, most courts agreed that, to persuade a court to
vacate an award on manifest disregard grounds, the losing party
must show: (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether; and (2) the law that the
arbitrators ignored was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case."· However, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed
the validity of the "manifest disregard" standard nor was its validity a
question presented to the Hall Street Court."'
Yet, the Hall Street Court offered a few comments about "manifest
disregard" when rejecting Hall Street's contentions about the significance of language in Wilko. Hall Street had argued that if judges can
add grounds of review to the FAA, like the Wilko Court did, then parties can, too."· The Court rejected Hall Street's logic by retorting that
Wilko did not, in fact, add "manifest disregard" as a ground for review.
Instead, in attempting to explain precisely what Wilko did mean when
it used the phrase "manifest disregard," the Court merely speculated:
Maybe the term "manifest disregard" [as used in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S
427 (1953)] was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it
merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to
them .... Or, as some courts have thought, "manifest disregard" may
have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded
their powers.,,59

The Court concluded only that the reference to "manifest disregard"
in Wilko did not signify, necessarily, that parties may expand grounds
to vacate contractually"o Thus, while the Hall Street Court did not
expressly reject "manifest disregard" as a valid ground for review, it
did not embrace it either.
IV. Hall Street Progeny: Lower Courts
In the decisions rendered immediately following Hall Street, lower
courts tried to make sense of the Supreme Court's less clear dicta
236
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regarding "manifest disregard," while applying the unambiguous Hall
Street holding. For example, one district judge reasoned that it would
be inconsistent to allow courts to craft from the bench vacatur grounds
not enumerated by the FAA, while disallowing parties to expand upon
those same grounds contractually.61 The Prime Therapeutics court
relied upon the Supreme Court's theory that Congress wrote FAA sections 9 through 11 to foster expedited review of arbitration awards
and any expansion or alteration of those provisions would undermine
that policy.62 Other district courts altogether rejected the continued
validity of the "manifest disregard" standard of review after Hall
Street. 63
By contrast, other lower courts at first concluded that Hall Street
did "nothing to jettison the manifest disregard standard."64 These
courts seized upon Hall Street's speculation that "manifest disregard"
might be judicial interpretation of section 10(a), and thus not extrastatutory.65 For example, in Hale, a credit card account holder brought
an arbitration claim against her credit card company, alleging it
violated the Truth in Lending Act through its interest rate charges. 66
An arbitrator deemed the customer's claim frivolous and awarded the
credit card company $5,600 in attorney's fees. The customer moved to
vacate the award, asserting that the arbitrator acted in "manifest disregard" of the law by awarding attorney's fees to her credit card
issuer. 61
The New York trial court applied Hall Street, and held the "manifest
disregard" standard was another way to interpret the FAA section
10(a)(4) requirement (arbitrators exceeded their powers).68 However,
since Hall Street did not define "manifest disregard" under section
1O(a)(4), the Hale court held arbitrators manifestly disregard the law
when the record indicates that they knew and deliberately ignored
well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable law that would affect the
outcome of the case. 69 Hale further held that "manifest disregard"
exceeds a merely erroneous application or interpretation of the law. 10
Applying that test, the Hale court confirmed the award, holding, inter
alia, arbitrators possess the authority to fashion appropriate remedies, which necessarily include awards of attorney's fees for claims
brought in bad faith."
Likewise, in Halliburton Energy Sues., Inc. u. NL Indus.,12 involving
a $10 million arbitration award stemming from the parties' disputes
over environmental remediation costs, a Texas district judge reviewed
the award for manifest disregard of the law. The Halliburton court
reasoned that Hall Street did not explicitly determine "whether the
'manifest disregard' standard remains a separate basis for federal
court reviews of arbitration decisions in at least some circumstances,"
and noted that considerable Fifth Circuit precedent allowed the ap237

.....

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL

plication of the "manifest disregard" standard of review. 73 Applying
the well-established test, the Halliburton court ultimately denied the
motion to vacate, determining that the movant "failed to carry its
burden to show that the panel's decisions interpreting the contracts in
the [clontract [plhase of the arbitration resulted from 'manifest disregard' of [applicablel contract law.'''4
As these cases demonstrate, in the first few months after Hall Street,
trial courts diverged in their approach to the task of reconciling Hall
Street with the manifest disregard standard of review.
V. Hall Street Appellate Court Progeny
As cases made their way up through the appellate system, a new
circuit split emerged, similar to the earlier lower court split. Thus, the
Second,75 Sixth,'· and Ninth77 Circuit Courts of Appeals recognized the
continued vitality of the manifest disregard ground of vacatur. For
example, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit concluded that Hall
Street did not abrogate the doctrine, but instead it "declined to resolve
that question explicitly."'8 The Second Circuit explained that it "views
the 'manifest disregard' doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a mechanism
to enforce the parties' agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial
review of the arbitrators' decision. We must therefore continue to bear
the responsibility to vacate arbitration awards in the rare instances
in which 'the arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that the principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue,
and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.' "'9 Likewise, in Comedy Club, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Hall Street was not "clearly irreconcilable" with prior Ninth Circuit
precedent that recognized "manifest disregard" as a prong of review
under FAA section lO(a)(4).80
By contrast, in Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,"' a district
court vacated on manifest disregard grounds a securities arbitration
award to an investor who claimed unauthorized withdrawals from her
investment account. The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected "manifest disregard" as a valid ground for vacatur, thus overturning Halliburton.· 2
The Bacon court reasoned that Hall Street unequivocally held the
statutory grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under the FAA.
As a result, because Fifth Circuit case law "defines manifest disregard
of the law as a non-statutory ground for vacatur, . . . manifest disregard of the law constitutes a nonstatutory ground for vacatur [andl is
no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA."·'
At the time of publication, two other circuits have addressed
manifest disregard under Hall Street, but in dicta only. The First
Circuit declined to consider the issue directly but stated summarily
that manifest disregard was no longer a valid ground for review after
238
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Hall Street. so The Eighth Circuit cited Hall Street as holding "an
arbitral award may be vacated only for the reasons enumerated in the
FAA."s,
VI. The Future of Manifest Disregard
It appears that this latest circuit split, developed less than one year
after Hall Street, is heading to the Supreme Court. The Court will
have to decide whether, under the FAA, "manifest disregard" is a
statutory ground for review, and thus permissible, or an extrastatutory ground, and thus prohibited under Hall Street. Did the
Wilko Court use the term "manifest disregard" to refer to one or more
of the four grounds listed under section 10, or did it unwittingly create fifty-five years of impermissible extra-statutory review by the
lower courts?
In my view, Hall Street does not abrogate the "manifest disregard"
standard of award review. Indeed, the Court stated that it has never
directly held whether a trial court can review an arbitration award for
"manifest disregard."s6 Rather, the strict constructionist majority
merely interpreted the FAA to preclude parties seeking vacatur from
asserting grounds other than those identified in FAA section 10, and
suggested that lower courts could construe the bases proVided by section 10 as inclusive of "manifest disregard." Hall Street delegated to
the lower courts the semantic task of assigning the "manifest disregard" label to one of the four sub-grounds of section 10, as the statute
is not incompatible with the label. Thus, parties can continue to challenge arbitration awards on the FAA ground that arbitrators committed misconduct under FAA section 10(a)(3) by manifestly disregarding
the law or exceeded the scope of its powers under FAA section 10(a)(4)
by manifestly disregarding the law. 67
Public policy also dictates that courts should preserve this ground
for review. First, the federal common law of this country - which
pre-dates and survives the enactment of the FAA - imposed a
"fundamental fairness" requirement on commercial arbitration. ss
While acknowledging the general principle that courts should
intervene only sparely in arbitration matters, courts reasoned that a
court asked to set aside an arbitration award is a court sitting in
equity, and no court of equity could confirm an award that resulted
from a fundamentally unfair process. ss If parties can show that a
panel manifestly disregarded the law, then it can show a fundamentally unfair process. "Manifest disregard" roots out fundamental
unfairness.
Second, if an arbitration panel manifestly disregards law arising
under a federal statutory cause of action, then disputing parties cannot effectively vindicate their statutory rights. The Supreme Court
has frowned upon unfair arbitration processes that do not permit par239
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ties to vindicate their statutory rights."o Depriving courts of the
manifest disregard weapon would frustrate their ability to enforce
that principle post-award.
Third, just as pre-Hall Street contracting parties insisted on
expanded grounds for review in any pre-dispute arbitration clause for
risk management purposes, those same parties are far less likely to
consent to arbitration if the Court eliminates manifest disregard. If
fewer commercial parties consent to arbitration, then the function of
arbitration as one means to alleviate the courts' dockets would
diminish. Thus, as a practical matter, to preserve the appeal of
arbitration, the Court should permit the risk management mechanism of manifest disregard. The national policy favoring arbitration
requires that the Court balance finality with judicial intervention
enough to ensure a minimal level of arbitrator accountability by
retaining the manifest disregard doctrine.
Finally, until Hall Street, every federal circuit had recognized
"manifest disregard" as a ground for review for many and varied
policy reasons. It seems "imprudent" to obliterate a half-century of
well-developed and well-reasoned jurisprudence based on semantics
and a rigid view of finality at all costs."' Simply put, I see the elimination of manifest disregard as a semantic blunder that, in the end, is
anti-arbitration.
Conclusion
For more than 55 years, courts have reviewed arbitration awards
governed by the FAA for arbitrators' "manifest disregard of the law."
That narrow doctrine emerged as one extremely limited - but wise check on the far-reaching powers of arbitrators to resolve disputes equitably, privately, quickly and at relatively low cost. According to
three out of four Courts of Appeals that thus far have squarely
considered the question, Hall Street did not eliminate that doctrine
from FAA jurisprudence. Unclear dicta in Hall Street should not collide with strong public policy reasons to allow for a narrow exception,
and a statutorily-supported ground to impose accountability on
arbitrators.

NOTES:
'9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.
'Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008).
'See 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (2008) ("If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a
judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is
made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
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confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this
title.").

'See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (listing narrow grounds for vacatur of an award based on errors in the arbitration process).
'See 9 U.S.C.A. § 11 (listing narrow grounds for modifying or correcting an award).
"For an extensive listing of federal courts' interpretation on non-statutory
grounds, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standard for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 763-801 (1996).
7See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming
vacatur of portion of award because it was "arbitrary and capricious").
·See, e.g., Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, North America, LLC, 497 F.3d
133, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitration award because arbitration panel
manifestly disregarded tbe law). Before Hall Street, every circuit had adopted the
manifest disregard test, although some circuits interpreted the standard far more
strictly than others. Compare Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d
752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (permitting vacatur for manifest disregard only for awards
that "would result in significant injustice") and Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany &
Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing vacatur for manifest disregard only
when an award directs the parties to violate the law) with Dawahare v. Spencer, 210
F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (defining manifest disregard test to be when the relevant law is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate, and the arbitrators
consciously chose not to apply it).
"See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging that federal court can vacate an arbitration award rendered contrary
to a "well-defined and dominant" public policy).
10Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L. J. 214, 215-18 (2007) (reviewing reasons why commercial parties to arbitration clauses might seek to provide for expanded judicial
review of awards).
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
"See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
139 U.S.C.A. § lOCal.
"Clauses that are now invalid include those that specify that a court can review
an award for "errors of law," or that awards are subject to de novo review in court.
"See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
'"See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
17
9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
1·See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
'"Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
20See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
21Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008).
229 U.S.C.A. § 10.
23Section 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order.
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In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration _
a. Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
b. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
c. Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof
and promote justice between the parties. 9 U.S.C.A. § II.

"Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,476 (1989).
2'Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,476 (1989) at 479.
2SSee Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 n.5 (2008). For a
discussion of the then-evolving circuit split, see generally Cole, supra note 10, at 21922; Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, DISP RESOL. J. 16 (Nov. 2006/Jan. 2007); Lee
Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 171 (2003).
"See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
2SSee Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2001).
29See .Syncor Intern. Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir.
1997) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
30See Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995)
3'See Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. In!'l Mktg. Strategies Inc., 401 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.
2005).
32E.g., Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCl Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-997
(5th Cir. 1995).
33See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d
1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
34See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2003).
"See Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
3·See Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001).
37E.g., Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d
1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
3·See United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR
- Toxic Substances - Trichloroethylene (TCE), available at: http://www.atsdr.cdc.go
v/substances/toxsubstance.asp?toxid-30 (last visited May 23, 2009).
39Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
40See Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act of 1981, Oregon Revised Statute (ORS)
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448 (Aug. 21, 1981).
"Hall St. Assocs., L.L. C. v. Mattei, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Or. 2001).
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-1401 (2008). The provision, in its entirety, ststsd: "The United States District Court for the District of
Oregon may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by
vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct
any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence; or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous." Hall Street
Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-1401 (2008) (citing post-dispute arbitration agreement).
44Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008).
,sHall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008).
45See LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997),
vacated by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential· Bache Trade Svcs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th
Cir.2003).
47Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei Inc., 2007 WL 656445 (D. Or. Feb. 26, 2007).
4SSee Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 272, 272-73 (9th Cir.
2004), citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Svcs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding the grounds for vacatur under 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 are exclusive and
parties cannot contract for alternative standards of review).
49Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008); see also Hall St.
Assocs., L.L. C. v. Mattei, Inc., 196 Fed. Appx. 476 (9th Cir. 2006); Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 550 U.S. 968 (2007) (cert. granted).
,oHall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403. Justice Souter was joined by five other Justices;
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, both filed dissenting
opinions.
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
52While the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit, it vacated the judgment and
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of independent issues.
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008); Hall St. Assocs. v.
Mattei Inc., 531 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008).
53Also left unresolved in Hall Street is the question of whether parties can invoke
state arbitration law as a separate source of vacatur remedies. The Hall Street Court
opined that the FAA procedures are only one route a party might invoke for judicial
review of arbitration awards: "The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards; they may contemplate enforcement under state
statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is
arguable." Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008). Thus, the
Court left the door open for parties wanting to invoke state arbitration law in state
court, even for actions arising out of arbitration agreements "involving commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 2. Since Hall Street, several stste courts have referred to their home state's
arbitration law as a separate avenue for vacatur, but those courts still disagree as to
whether their state's arbitration law allows for expanded grounds of review. Compare
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008) (holding Hall Street
does not preclude state courts from enforcing agreements to expand the grounds of
review of arbitration awards under state law), with Quinn v. Nafta Traders, Inc., 257
S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008) (concluding that Texas' arbitration act, like the
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FAA, provides for expedited review of arbitration awards only on those grounds specified in the statute; parties cannot expand those grounds by contract). A related issue
is whether FAA section 10 preempts state vacatur law in state court. I have previously written that in does not, except in the rare circumstance where state vacatur
law permits broad de novo review of award. See Jill 1. Gross, Over-Preemption of State
Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004). Thus, state law
might very well provide alternative vacatur procedures.
5'Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson IAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
55Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953). The Court, in turn, cited to an
1874 Supreme Court decision where the Court reviewed an admiralty arbitration
award for "manifest mistake of law," which it equated to "misapprehension of the
law," or if "arbitrators violated any principle of law." United States v. Farragut, 89
U.S. 406,420-231 (1874).
56See , e.g., GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). Most
courts and commentators agreed that this standard is very difficult to meet and
leaves most disputants with virtually no avenue for appeal if they believe the arbitrators misapplied the law. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration
Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415
(2003); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and
Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005); Norman S. Poser, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471
(1998) (arguing that manifest disregard standard is inadequate).
57See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (dictum)
(citing Wilko as providing one of few "unusual circumstances" under which a court
can set aside "all arbitration award and describing Wilko as stating "parties bound by
arbitrator's decision not in 'manifest disregard' of the law") (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953».
,sHali Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008).
59Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
6°Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
61Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp.2d 993, 999 (D. Minn.
2008).
2
6 Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp.2d 993, 999 (D. Minn.
2008).
"See Medicine Shoppe Intern. Inc. v. Simmonds, 2009 WL 367703, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. 2009) (concluding that the Hall Street Court "determined that because 'manifest
disregard for the law' is not a prescribed basis upon which an arbitrator's award may
be vacated or modified under §§ 10 or 11, a reviewing court cannot engage in such a
general review of an arbitrator's award to search for any legal error"); Robert Lewis
Rosen Assoc. Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp.2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding manifest
disregard of the law standard "no longer good law"), overruled by Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F .3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008); ALS & Associates, Inc. v.
AGM Marine Constructors, Inc., 557 F. Supp.2d 180, 185 (D. Mass. June 2, 2008);
Ascension Orthopedics, Inc. v. Curasan, AG, 2008 WL 2074058, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May
14, 2008); Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2009 WL 104666, at *5 (Ala. Jan. 9, 2009).
6'Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008); see
also Mastec North America, Inc. v. MSE Power Systems, Inc., 581 F. Supp.2d 321
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (considering a "manifest disregard" challenge to an award but deny-
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ing it on the merits).
65See, e.g., Mastec North America, 581 F. Supp.2d at 325 (citing Chase Bank
USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49) (electing to view "manifest disregard" of
law as jndicial interpretation of the Section 10 requirements, rather than as a separate standard of review, and will "resort to existing case law to determine its
contours").

66Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008); 15
U.S.CA §§ 1601 et seq.
67Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347-348 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2008).
6sChase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2008). The trial court assumed without deciding that FAA section 10 grounds applied
in state court, and thus preempted state vacatur law. For a discussion of whether section 10 preempts state vacatur law, see Gross, supra note 53.
s9Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2008).
70Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2008).
"Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2008).
'"Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
73Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733, 753 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
74Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733, 762 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
75Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008)
(recognizing post-Hall Street split and stating that "[w]e agree with those courts that
take the. . . approach [that manifest disregard remains a valid ground for vacating
arbitration awards]"), cert. granted, No. 08-1198, 2009 WL 803120 (June 15, 2009).
76Coffee Beanery, Ltd. V. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) ("In
light of the Supreme Court's hesitation to reject the 'manifest disregard' doctrine in
all circumstances, we believe it would be imprudent to cease employing such a
universally recognized principle. Accordingly, this Court will follow its wellestablished precedent here and continue to employ .the 'manifest disregard'
standard."); see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. V. Bank of Oklahoma, 304 Fed.
Appx. 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
77Comedy Club, Inc. V. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating "[w]e cannot say that Hall Street Associates is 'clearly irreconcilable' with
Kyocera and thus we are bound by our prior precedent. Therefore, we conclude that,
after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard of the law remains a valid ground for
vacatur because it is a part of § 10(a)(4)") (internal citations omitted).
7·Stolt-Nielsen SA u. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008).
79Stolt-Nielsen SA V. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 217). In so holding, the Second Circuit drew from a
pre-Hall Street decision in which the Seventh Circuit equated the FAA vacatur mechanism as a means for a losing arbitration party to challenge the award on the ground
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the arbitrators violated the arbitration agreement, rather than on the -ground the
arbitrators were mistaken. 548 F.3d at 95 (citing Wise v. Wachovia Sees., LLC, 450
F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006».
aOComedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997, and its holding that "arbitrators 'exceed their powers' . . . when the award is 'completely irrational,' or exhibits a 'manifest disregard of
law' ") (internal citations omitted).
a'Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
a2Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) .
•3Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009); see
also Hereford v. Horton, 2009 WL 104666, at *4-5 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 2009) ("Under the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates, therefore, manifest disregard of
the law is no longer an independent and proper basis under the Federal Arbitration
Act for vacating, modifYing, or correcting an arbitrator's award."); Vermont Built, Inc.
v. Krolick, 969 A.2d 80, 85-86 n.2 (Vt. 2008) (stating that Hall Street "held that
under the Federal Arbitration Act a court has no authority to review for an
arbitrator's legal errors" and clarifying that, under Vermont law, "we do not recognize
a court's right to review an arbitrator's decision for manifest disregard of the law") .
··Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120, 124, n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)
(stating in dicta that "[wle acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in Hall
Street . . .. that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or
modifYing an arbitral award in caseS brought under the [FAAl. Because the case at
hand is not an FAA case - neither party has invoked the FAA's expedited review
provisions, and the original complaint was filed in Puerto Rico state court under a
mechanism provided by state law - we decline to reach the question of whether Hall
Street precludes a manifest disregard inquiry in this setting") .
•5Crawford Group, Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F_3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008» .
•6Hall Street Assocs_ v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (insisting that
"[wle, when speaking as a Court, have merely taken the Wilko language as we found
it, without embellishment, see First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995), and now that its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the significance [Le., that Wilko held that "manifest disregard" was a valid ground for
reviewl that Hall Street urges.")
.7Even the Bacon Court acknowledge that it eliminated manifest disregard as a
ground for review after Hall Street because Fifth Circuit precedent had semantically
labeled manifest disregard as extra-statutory. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
··Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) (confirming award in a commercial
dispute between a retailer and two wholesalers and stating that "after a full and fair
hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or
in fact") .
• 9Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
90See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) (suggesting that excessive or overly burdensome forum fees, if proven, might bar a court from
enforcing an arbitration agreement on the grounds that one party cannot vindicate its
statutory rights); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985) (declaring that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federall statute
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[providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function"); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2006) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement without severing the clause that precludes
class action arbitration claims on the grounds that it deprives claimants from vindicating their statutory rights). See generally Jill 1. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The
Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 510 (2008)
(describing "vindicating rights" doctrine); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions
and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 269-73 (2006) (describing the "effectively
vindicate" doctrine and noting that the "Supreme Court has yet to flesh out the . . .
doctrine") .
• 'Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.£.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008)
(declaring that "we believe it would be imprudent to cease employing such a
universally recognized principle").
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